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BRENNAN v. BUCKEYE INDUSTRIES, INC.:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN
OSHA WARRANTLESS SEARCH
In Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc.,' the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia held that warrantless administrative
entry of a business establishment for the purpose of an inspection pur-
suant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19702 (OSHA) was
not an unreasonable search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.3 The case arose when an OSHA inspector, without first obtain-
ing a search warrant, went to inspect the Buckeye Industries plant,4
which was not open to -the public. She sought admittance by show-
ing the plant manager her credentials and announcing her intention
to conduct a "general inspection."5  Because of the plant manager's
desire to have Buckeye's attorney from Jacksonville, Florida, present
as the company's authorized representative0 during the inspector's
walk-around and the inspector's unwillingness to await the lawyer's
arrival, access to the facility was denied. 7  The following day the Sec-
1. 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1970).
3. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Buckeye case is the first in the federal courts to deal with the issue of the con-
stitutionality of OSHA inspections. The court also discussed the issues of jurisdiction
and exhaustion of administrative remedies involved in the case. A second case dealing
with the constitutional issue was recently filed in Texas. See Brennan v. Gibson Prods.,
Inc., Civil No. S-75-5-CA (E.D. Tex., filed Jan. 20, 1975). The constitutional question
has also been discussed at the administrative hearing level. See Accu-Namics, Inc.,
1973-74 CCH Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. ff 17,936, at 22,232-33 (O.S.H.R.C., May
30, 1974); Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 1971-1973 CCH Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH
DEC. 115,238 (O.S.H.R.C. 1972).
4. Buckeye Industries manufactures men's clothing. The plant is located in
Wrightsville, Ga.
5. 374 F. Supp. at 1351. OSHA inspections fall into four general categories of
decreasing urgency and priority: (1) catastrophe or fatality investigations, (2) com-
plaint investigations, (3) Target Industry Program (TIP) investigations, and (4) general
inspections. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Field Operations Manual, 2 BNA Occ. SArY &
HEALTH REP., ch. IV, parts B(1), (2), (3), at 77:2301-04 (1974).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1970).
7. 374 F. Supp. at 1351.
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retary of Labor sought an order" from the district court requiring
Buckeye to submit to an inspection of its facilities.' In response to
the company's claim that warrantless OSHA inspections violate the
fourth amendment, the government conceded the absence of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant 0 but contended that the
Secretary of Labor has the right to inspect businesses within the cov-
erage of the Act without any showing of probable cause of viola-
tions." Chief Judge Lawrence agreed with the government argu-
ments and ruled that in the context of -the regulatory power exer-
cised by the federal government, there was a "compelling need" for
unannounced inspections under OSHA"s and that warrantless admin-
istrative entries for OSHA inspections of private commercial premises
were valid.'3 The court reasoned that requiring a demonstration of
probable cause for issuing an administrative search warrant would
effectively render the Act useless.' 4
OSHA, which is applicable to some sixty million employees and
five million businesses,' 5 was enacted by Congress "to assure so far
as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions . . ."I' To effectuate this broad pur-
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1974). U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 5, ch. V, parts
D(2) (g), (h), at 77:2506-07.
9. 374 F. Supp. at 1351.
10. Respondents' Reply to Secretary's Memorandum of Authorities at 2, Brennan v.
Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
11. 374 F. Supp. at 1351-52.
12. The Act provides that "[amny person who gives advance notice of any inspection
to be conducted under this chapter, without authority from the Secretary or his de-
signees, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both." 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1970).
But see notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text.
13. 374 F. Supp. at 1354.
14. Id.
15. Robbins, Truth and Rumor About OSHA, 33 FED. B.J. 149, 149 (1974). The
author observed, "OSHA coverage is comprehensive. Virtually every private employer,
except those specifically excepted by virtue of coverage under other legislation and those
who are self-employed, is included." Id. No other piece of federal legislation so ex-
tensively and pervasively involves itself in the affairs of American private industry.
PRACTISING LAW INsTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH Acr: TRENDS AND DE-
VELOPMENTS 9 (M. Stokes ed. 1974). As one Senator has observed, OSHA applies to
"every business affecting commerce in the entire United States, ranging anywhere from
a big steel company to a shoeshine shop." 116 CONG. REc. 36,509 (1970) (remarks
of Senator Dominick).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970). Under OSHA it is the duty of each employer to
"furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm ... ." Id. § 654(a) (1). In addition, employers are
[tlo comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under
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pose, the Act provides specific inspection and enforcement procedures
which allow government personnel, upon presenting appropriate cre-
dentials, to enter at reasonable times the premises of all workplaces
covered by the Act for the purpose of inspecting and investigating
working conditions.' Even though the legislative history of the Act
indicates congressional concern with possible conflicts between
the Act's investigatory provisions and the right to privacy protected
by the fourth amendment,' 8 the enforcement scheme contains no
search warrant requirement or other judicial protection. 9 OSHA
the Act, . . . post notices to keep employees informed of their rights and du-
ties, including provisions of applicable standards, . . . maintain records of all
work-related injuries, illnesses, deaths and exposure of employees to toxic mate-
rials and harmful physical agents, . .. provide physical examination for em-
ployees to determine if exposure to toxic substances or potentially harmful
physical agents has exceeded permissible limits, . . . [and] post copies of cita-
tions of violations at or near each place a violation has occurred. PRACTIS1nG
LAw INsTrruTE, supra note 15, at 11.
Failure adequately to meet these requirements may result in both civil and criminal pen-
alties. See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). For a recent case discussing the constitutionality
of the imposition of civil penalties under OSHA, see Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC,
2 BNA Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1283 (3d Cir.), vacated pending rehearing, 2 BNA
Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1445 (1974).
For general discussions of the Act, see PRAcnsmo LAW INsTrrur E, supra note 15;
Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Much Ado About Something, 3 LoYoLA
Cn. L.J. 247 (1972); White, Jr., & Carney, OSHA Comes of Age: The Law of Work
Place Environment, 28 Bus. LAw. 1309 (1973); Symposium--Occupational Safety and
Health, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRon. 583 (1974); Symposium: The Developing Law of
Occupational Safety and Health, 9 GONZAGA L. REv. 317 (1974); Comment, The Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: An Overview, 4 CUMBEoLAND-SAMFoRD L.
REv. 525 (1974); Note, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: Some Unre-
solved Issues and Potential Problems, 41 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 304 (1972); Comment,
OSHA: Employer Beware, 10 HousvoN L. REv. 426 (1973).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1), (2) (1970). The Secretary of Labor is authorized
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, estab-
lishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where
work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other rea-
sonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner,
any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures,
machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to
question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee.
Id.
18. During the course of debate on OSHA, Congressman Steiger, one of the bill's
co-authors, specifically stated that "in carrying out inspection duties under the legisla-
tion, the Secretary [of Labor] of course, would have to act in accordance with appli-
cable constitutional protections." 116 CONG. REc. 38,709 (1970).
19. The legislation provides simply that representatives of the Secretary of Labor
present their credentials to the agent in charge of the business and make their inspec-
tions during regular working hours and in a reasonable manner. The owner is entitled
to have a representative present throughout the course of the investigation and -the right
to inspect is confined to those structures and conditions having relevance to the Act.
29 U.S.C. §§ 657(a)(1)(2), (e) (1970); see Comment, OSHA: Employer Beware,
supra note 16, at 445.
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provides no penalty for an employer's refusal to permit a warrant-
less search, and Labor Department regulations require that a warrant
be sought in the face of such a refusal. 2  The central issue presented
in Buckeye was whether a showing of probable cause for the issuance
of this warrant for an administrative search was constitutionally
mandated.
The Supreme Court, in two fairly recent lines of cases, has abro-
gated what was the traditional rule2 of not requiring warrants for
administrative searches. In Camara v. Municipal Court,2" a case in-
volving a tenant's conviction for refusal to allow a warrantless in-
spection of his apartment by housing inspectors, the Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment required the obtaining of a search
warrant for unconsented "area"23 inspections of private dwellings for
health code violations.2 4  The probable cause standard required to be
20. U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 5, ch. V, part D(2) (Refusal to Permit Inspec-
tion-Warrants), at 77:2505-09; see PRAcns rG LAw IN sTrrum, supra note 15, at 89;
Symposium: The Developing Law of Occupational Safety and Health, supra note 16,
at 559.
21. The traditional rule was announced in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959),
where the Supreme Court first dealt with the applicability of the fourth amendment to
administrative searches. In a five to four decision, the Court upheld the conviction of
a homeowner who had refused entry to a municipal health inspector who did not have
a warrant. Viewing health inspections as reaching "at most the periphery" of constitu-
tional protections against official intrusion, id. at 367, Justice Frankfurter relied pri-
marily upon the distinction between the civil nature of administrative investigations and
the more traditional criminal searches to make fourth amendment safeguards applicable
'only to criminal investigations. Id. at 365-67. See also LaFave, Administrative
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 Sup. Cr. Rar.
1, 8 n.27.
For general discussions of administrative search warrants, see 1 K. DAVIs § 3.05
(1958); J. LANDYNsEi, SEARCH AND SEizRE AND THE SUPREME COURT-A STUDY IN
CONSTnTUTONAL INTERPRETATION (1966); Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory
and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since
Camara and See, 61 CAuri. L. Rnv. 1011 (1973); LaFave, supra; Note, Administrative
Searches and the Right to Privacy in the United States, 23 IN'r'L & CoIvn,. L.Q. 169
(1974); Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MN. L. REv. 607 (1974); Note,
Inspections by Administrative Agencies: Clarification of the Warrant Requirement, 49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 879 (1974); Note, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth
Amendment, 12 WASHBURN LJ. 203 (1973); Note, The Law of Administrative Inspec-
tions: Are Camara and See Still Alive and Well?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 313.
22. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
23. See Note, Administrative Search Warrants, supra note 21, at 637-640, for a dis-
cussion of area searches. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275-
85 (Powell, J., concurring) (1973).
24. 387 U.S. at 534. In rejecting the Frank rationale, see note 21 supra, the Court
stated:
[W]e cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these in-
spections are merely "peripheral." It is surely anomalous to say that the indi-
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satisfied for the issuance of an administrative warrant was to be de-
termined by applying a "balancing test";25 the stronger and more
compelling the governmental interest in the search or entry, the
lower the threshold of probable cause required.2 6  In See v. City of
Seattle,'2 7 a case involving fire inspections of commercial establish-
ments, the Court extended the Camara warrant and flexible proba-
ble cause requirements to inspections of those portions of business
premises not open to the public, 28 but suggested that licensing pro-
grams which require inspections prior to operating a business might
well remain beyond the scope of the Camara warrant requirement.29
The Camara-See rule was refined by a line of Supreme Court
cases beginning in 1970. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States,30 which involved a forcible warrantless inspection of a busi-
ness establishment possessing a liquor license, the Court held that a
statutorily authorized administrative search carried out in an "industry
long subject to close supervision and inspection"31 did not offend the
fourth amendment.32 Expanding on the narrow holding of Colonnade,3
vidual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. Id. at 530.
25. Id. at 536-37. "inhere can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search en-
tails." Id. See also Greenberg, supra note 21, at 1046-47.
26. 387 U.S. at 538-39. Two important exceptions to its warrant ruling were noted
by the Camara Court-inspections without a warrant are not to be foreclosed in emer-
gency situations and a warrant is not necessary if proper consent is given prior to the
search. Id. at 539.
27. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
28. Id. at 545. The See Court, however, noted that it was not deciding
whether warrants to inspect business premises may be issued only after access
is refused; since surprise may often be a crucial aspect of routine inspections
of business establishments, the reasonableness of warrants issued in advance of
inspection will necessarily vary with the nature of the regulation involved and
may differ from standards applicable to private homes. Id. n.6.
29. Id. at 545-46. The Court also indicated that it might allow business premises
to be inspected in many more situations than private homes, although the warrant proce-
dure would remain equally applicable to both. Id. Justice Clark, joined by Justices Har-
lan and Stewart, wrote the combined dissent in Camara and See, stressing what he fore-
saw as the disastrous practical effects of the decisions. The dissent challenged the ma-
jority's view that there would be little use of the warrant requirement, noting that human
nature and the prospects for costly repairs would insure a large number of refusals of
entry to inspect. Id. at 546-55.
30. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
31. Id. at 77.
32. Id. Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas emphasized the long history of scru-
tiny the federal government has imposed on the manufacture, sale, and transport of alco-
holic beverages. Id. at 75. Noting that Congress has broad powers to establish stand-
ards of reasonableness for searches and seizures in the closely regulated area of liquor
control, id. at 77, it was but a small step for -the Court to reason that the fourth amend-
Ment's requiremert of reisonableness had been satisfied by the particular object of the
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the Court in United States v. Biswel3 4 held that a warrantless search
of a locked pawnshop storeroom pursuant to the Gun Control Act of
196811 was valid because of the "pervasively regulated '8 6 nature of
the gun sales industry.3 7  Recently, in Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal
Co. v. Morton,3 8 a district court, apparently for the first time, ex-
tended into the occupational safety and health field the Biswell "per-
vasively regulated" industry exception to the warrant requirement of
Camara.39  The court upheld warrantless searches of coal mines
made pursuant to the Federal Coal Mine and Safety Act40 and based
its decision upon traditional federal regulation of the coal mining in-
dustry.4 The Colonnade-Biswell line of cases adopted what is es-
sentially a two-tiered test of the validity of warrantless administrative
searches absent probable cause to suspect a violation: (1) an "urgent
federal interest"'42 in a "pervasively regulated" 43 industry must be
search in Colonnade. As a result, the holding did not rest primarily on the fact that
the statutes involved might be considered "reasonable," but rather on the historically ac-
cepted governmental regulatory interest in liquor.
33. Colonnade was not at first viewed as evidence that the Camara-See warrant re-
quirement was undergoing refinement. See Note, Administrative Search Warrants, supra
note 21, at 615. It was not until the following year that the break became more appar-
ent in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), where the Court held that a warrantless
visit to the home of a welfare recipient, carried out under the provisions of New York
law, did not constitute a search within the fourth amendment and that even if it did,
it met the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness.
34. 406U.S. 311 (1972).
35. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 et seq. (1970).
36. 406 U.S. at 316.
37. Id. at 317. The decision was clearly not intended to be limited to the facts of
the case, for the Court established several prerequisites in order for a warrantless inspec-
tion statute to meet the "reasonableness" requirement of the fourth amendment. To al-
low warrantless entry, an "urgent federal interest," id., must be at stake in a feder-
ally regulated industry and the inspection must be a crucial part of this established
regulatory scheme, id. at 315. Furthermore, the Court held that flexibility and surprise
as to time, scope, and frequency of entry must be deemed vital and the inspection must
pose only a limited threat to justifiable expectations of privacy. Id. at 316; see Note,
Inspections by Administrative Agencies, supra note 21, at 887-88.
38. 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
39. Over the course of the past three years, the "pervasively regulated" test has also
been met in such areas as the control of food products, pharmaceuticals, and drugs. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
93 S. Ct. 137 (1974); United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371
(D. Del. 1972).
40. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970).
41. 364 F. Supp. at 47. This district court recognized the continuing validity of the
Camara-See rule, maintaining that "warrantless searches conducted without prior judicial
approval are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few
jealously limited and carefully guarded exceptions." Id. at 48.
42. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
43. Id. at 316.
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involved; and (2) the inspection procedures themselves must be rea-
sonable in time, manner, and scope.44
Despite considerable attention by the Court to the problem of
warrantless administrative searches in both the Camara-See and Col-
onnade-Biswell lines of cases, there remain areas of considerable un-
certainty.45 For example, the law is unclear where a business is sub-
ject to a regulatory scheme which is not as pervasive as that found
in Biswell or where an otherwise unregulated industry engages in
specific activities that are subject to an investigatory scheme such as
the one found in OSHA .4  Use of the two-tiered analysis would pro-
vide an intelligible framework within which administrative search
problems which are not clearly controlled by either the Camara-See
line or by the Colonnade-Biswell line of cases could be solved.
In Buckeye, the court relied solely upon -the second branch of
the two-tiered test 47 to uphold the warrantless OSHA entry; it ignored
the initial inquiry into the presence or absence of a "pervasively regu-
lated" industry and proceeded to examine the reasonableness of the
OSHA scheme in time and scope.4s No distinction was seen between
the "area"49 searches of the Camara-See line on the one hand, and
investigations of "pervasively regulated" businesses under Colonnade-
Biswell on the other. The court simply reasoned that the trend in ad-
ministrative search cases was toward warrantless entry. 50 Implicit in
the Buckeye court's upholding of warrantless OSHA inspections with-
out a showing of probable cause was the premise -that the success of
the investigatory scheme of the Act depended upon the "surprise" of
unannounced inspections. 51
The Buckeye holding is subject to criticism for its misreading of
44. Id. at 315. See notes 30-41 supra and accompanying text. Only when the first
part of the test is satisfied need one be concerned with the second requirement of a rea-
sonable inspection procedure outlined by a valid statute. That is, only within the con-
text of a qualifying regulatory scheme will the reasonableness of the statute be explored.
45. See Note, Administrative Search Warrants, supra note 21, at 608. However,
Camara and See still have vitality, and it is misleading to contend that "the [Supreme
Court] has followed the track back very close to where it began with its holding in
Frank v. Maryland." Note, Inspections by Administrative Agencies, supra note 21, at
890.
46. See Note, Administrative Search Warrants, supra note 21, at 622-24.
47. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
48. 374 F. Supp. at 1354.
49. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
50. 374 F. Supp. at 1354-56. The court provided only the most superficial analysis
of the line of cases from Camara to Biswell and on to Youghiogheny.
51. Id. at 1354. Such a holding is not necessarily beyond the scope of the Camara-
See line of cases. See note 28 supra.
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both case precedent52 and the Act itself.53 On its facts the case ap-
pears to fit the Camara-See line better than the Colonnade-Biswell
line: Camara and See both dealt with health and safety inspections, 4
just as OSHA does; 55 Camara and See involved area-wide searches not
focusing on individual persons or particular businesses,50 very much
analogous to the broad sweep of OSHA; 57 and the fire and health
codes in Camara and See had as their principle objective securing
compliance rather than prosecution,58 as does OSHA.59  Also, the need
for surprise inspections to insure the success of the Act, which was re-
lied upon by the Buckeye court to authorize warrantless OSHA en-
tries, appears to have been overstated. 0 The Secretary of Labor has
recognized that because compliance is the goal of the Act, allowing
advance notice of inspections may contribute to, not detract from,
the statutory scheme by encouraging the early correction of defects
before injuries occur."' Even if an inspector were required to obtain
52. The very cases on which the Buckeye court relied to support its placing of
OSHA searches in the Colonnade-Bisvell line-Biswell, United States ex rel. Terraciano
v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 137 (1974), and Youghi-
ogheny-all specifically based their holdings on the fact that only in the context of a
pervasively federally regulated business will the reasonableness of the statute be ex-
plored. In Biswell, the Supreme Court stated that "when a dealer chooses to engage in
this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license ...inspection may
proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute." 406 U.S. at 316-
17 (emphasis added). Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit quoted approvingly from
one of his colleagues' holdings that warrantless searches are acceptable only in "an in-
spection statutorily limited to the business records and goods of industries that are prop-
erly subject to intensive regulation in the public interest." 493 F.2d at 685 (emphasis
added). And the Youghiogheny district court also made this point when it held that
"the plaintiff at bar, a business in a pervasively regulated industry, has consented by
implication at least, to reasonable intrusion by federal authorities." 364 F. Supp. at 50
(emphasis added). Buckeye Industries did not meet the first part of the two-tiered test.
As a clothing manufacturer, Buckeye was not in a pervasively regulated business.
53. See notes 60-61 infra.
54. See notes 22-29 supra and accompanying text.
55. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
56. 387 U.S. at 533, 541.
57. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b), 654 (1970).
58. See Note, Administrative Search Warrants, supra note 21, at 638-39.
59. In discussing the House-Senate conference report on OSHA, one floor-leader of
the bill noted that OSHA "emphasizes the preventative rather than the punitive aspect
of job safety regulation." 116 CONG. REc. 42,203 (1970) (remarks of Congressman
Daniels).
60. 374 F. Supp. at 1354. It is true that Congress provided that any person "who
gives advance notice of [an OSHA] inspection ...without authority" may be prose-
cuted. 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1970). The sanction, however, does not mean that advance
notice of inspections is absolutely prohibited.
61. See 29 C.F.R. § 19036 (1974). U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 5, ch. V, part
B (Advance Notice of Inspections), at 77:2501-03. The rules do not authorize a broad
use of advance notice but do recognize its value when it "would enhance the probability
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a warrant by swearing out an affidavit and obtaining a magistrate's
signature, surprise would not necessarily be eliminated 2 since more
than one inspection might be authorized per warrant, as is the prac-
tice in area searches, and the level of probable cause need not be un-
duly high.6 3 Furthermore, the inconvenience of obtaining a warrant
based on probable cause would not seem to be an excessive burden
on the government.6 4  Factors such as the type of industry inspected
and the time elapsed since the last inspection could be employed to
evaluate the level of probable cause required.6 5 Finally, the court
ignored completely possible affirmative benefits which requiring a
warrant for OSHA entries might provide. In particular, a magis-
trate's review of warrant requests could insure a check on how busi-
nesses are targeted for inspection"6 and would help deter harass-
ment tactics which might be employed by inspectors.6 7
The policy underlying OSHA is laudable, and the district court's
fervor in enforcing the Act is understandable.6 8  This enforcement,
of an effective and thorough inspection." 29 C.F.R. § 1903.6(a) (4) (1974). See also
Remarks of George H. Cohen before Ohio Legal Center Institute Annual Midwest Labor
Law Conference, 1972-73 BNA Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 584, 587-88.
62. See Greenberg, supra note 21, at 1022-23.
63. Id. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
64. Though the swearing out of an affidavit might take a small amount of time and
be an inconvenience to the OSHA inspector, it would only reach the level of an excessive
burden if it served to frustrate the aim of the Act. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 533 (1967). See Greenberg, supra note 21, at 1023.
65. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
66. The fact that certain businesses in a given industry are inspected and fined while
others are not inspected at all may result in unwarranted economic advantage to those
firms passed over.
67. At the present time the worry need not be that OSHA inspectors would be mak-
ing daily searches of a business as a method of harassment, since there are only some
five hundred compliance officers to cover approximately five million businesses. Har-
assment, however, might take the form of overzealous enforcement once there is an in-
spection. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 89; Greenberg, supra note
21, at 1023.
68. The Supreme Court has yet to consider the question of the application of the
warrant requirement to OSHA inspections, but last year reviewed the question of the
need for a search warrant in a case involving a pollution control statute-legislation sim-
ilar to OSHA in that its highly regulated standards apply across the board to numerous
unregulated industries. The case involved a Colorado health inspector who had made
an opacity test of smoke being emitted from a company's chimney while standing outside
on the firm's property, without the firm's knowledge or consent and without a warrant.
The Colorado Court of Appeals held this test to be an unreasonable search within the
fourth amendment, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fourth amendment
protections do not extend to sights seen "in the open fields." Air Pollution Variance
Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2115-16 (1974), rev'g 510 P.2d 907 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1973). In emphasizing the continuing vitality of Camara and See, however,
the Court indicated that its ruling might have been different if this inspection had been
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however, should not extend beyond fundamental fourth amendment
legal principles applicable to administrative searches. The result
reached in Buckeye would effectively extend the warrantless entry ex-
ception now limited to "pervasively regulated" industries to all busi-
nesses in general. When Judge Lawrence observed that insistence on
a search warrant based on probable cause is, "constitutionally speak-
ing, marching to the beat of an antique drum," 69 it was the court,
not the corporation, that was out of step.
made inside the plant in areas from which the public was excluded, as is generally the
case with OSHA inspections. 94 S. Ct. at 2116.
69. 374 F. Supp. at 1356.
